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The paper shows that civil war in Burundi in the 1990s has provoked an unprecedented decline in 
government revenue. Both foreign aid transfers and revenue from domestic sources dried up, inducing 
the government to rely more on inflation tax. Using quarterly data covering the period from 1980:1 to 
2002:4 to measure the sensitivity of money demand to inflation we find that the long-run semi-elasticity 
of inflation to real money in circulation trebled between the pre-war to the war period. The remarkable 
increase of the semi-elasticity translates what is known in the literature as economic agents￿ ￿flight from 
domestic currency￿, a strategy that limits the government￿s capacity to use inflation tax to compensate for 
the loss in more traditional revenue sources. Shedding light on the behaviour of the demand for real 
money amidst persistent political and economic instability, illustrates the limits of using inflation and 
money creation as a dependable source of government revenue.  
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As its name suggests, the inflation tax is defined as ￿the tax imposed on money holders as a 
result of inflation￿ [Blanchard and Fischer (1989: 198)]. This definition clearly identifies inflation 
and the stock of money held by economic agents as two determinants of inflation tax. In this 
study, we firstly show the extent to which the eruption of war in Burundi in October 1993 led to 
a remarkable decline of government revenue. Secondly, we establish that the increase in the 
long-run semi-elasticity (LRSE) of real money demand to inflation between the periods before 
and during the war induced economic agents to flee from the domestic currency. This strategy 
limited the government￿s ability to use inflation tax as a dependable alternative source of 
government revenue in periods of political instability. The implication from the analysis is that in 
cases of prolonged political instability, inflation tax cannot be relied upon as a substitute for the 
more traditional government revenue sources. 
Despite Burundi￿s long history of political instability, there is no research on the 
economic consequences of past and present wars on the country. The thrust of this study is to 
show that the war that erupted in 1993 created an important regime change with respect to 
government revenue. Traditionally characterised by low inflation tax, Burundi government relied 
more and more on this source as its traditional domestic and external revenue sources dried up. 




limited despite the centrality of the question for macroeconomic policy [AgØnor and Taylor 
(1992)].
1 This study contributes towards bridging this knowledge gap.  
An attempt is made to determine when the policy change due to the war occurred and 
whether it happened suddenly reflecting a ￿crash￿ in the variable of interest, or gradually 
reflecting a ￿changing growth￿ pattern.
2 This is a useful distinction since a crash suggests that a 
shock is temporary while a changing growth pattern translates a permanent shock [Perron 
(1989)]. 
Burundi is an appropriate case study because it has had periods of relative political 
stability followed by periods of extreme instability, providing a good sample period to analyse 
shock-induced policy changes. As Hendry (2001: 20) notes, there is no doubt that ￿changes in 
legislation, sudden switches in economic policy, and political turmoil￿ cause large shocks or 
￿breaks￿ in the economy. Analysing policy choices based on time series may provide a richer 
framework than cross-regime tests that rely on cross-sectional evidence. While the latter 
aggregates a country￿s time series information into one point, the former has the potential to use 
all the information available across a long period of time, including institutional information, to 
understand the process underlying a regime change.
3 
                                                 
1  Despite the popularity of the Lucas critique in some circles, changes in institutional environments affect 
policymaking and hence the economy, as we attempt to show using the case of Burundi. 
2 Throughout the analysis, political instability is assumed to result from an exogenous shock. Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza (2003) provide a more detailed discussion of political instability in Burundi as the result of bad socio-
political and economic policies. 
3Most of the studies on the subject are cross-sectional and fail to capture the dynamic nature of the incentive 
structure facing policymakers. They also fail to recognise the potential heterogeneity of the countries in their 




In the remainder of the paper, section 2 presents a brief literature review followed by a 
background of Burundi￿s economy before and during the war period. In the third section, the 
study discusses the methodology used to derive the level of maximum inflation tax and the long-
run semi elasticity of inflation to money demand. The fourth section discusses the data and 
attempts to ￿date￿ structural change in the variables of interest. Section 5 discusses empirical 
econometric results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Political Instability, Inflation Tax and Economic Performance 
2.1. Review of the Literature and General Background 
In the studies of the effect of instability on economic performance, instability has often been 
defined in terms of the turnover of policy makers [see, for instance, Edwards and Tabellini 
(1991), Cukierman, et al. (1992), Nkurunziza and Bates (2003)]. However, in his empirical study 
of political instability and economic growth, Ali (2001) argues that the relevant measures of 
instability should be the volatility of economic policies. The author shows that, using the most 
common measures, political instability has no discernible effect on growth.  
Other proxies of political instability such as the number of assassinations [Easterly and 
Levine (1997)] or the duration of wars [Collier and Gunning (1999)] do not produce statistically 
significant results in cross section or panel data models. The non-significance of the instability 
measures may be attributed to poor proxies used.
4 Ali (2001) finds that using measures of 
economic ￿policy volatility￿ explains better the variations in growth across countries. 
                                                 
4 For instance, the fact that the vast majority of countries in the sample have never experienced war may explain 
why the variable measuring war duration comes out insignificant in cross-section or panel data analysis. In this 




Nkurunziza and Bates (2003) note that it is strikingly counter-intuitive to conclude that 
political instability has no impact on economic performance as some studies have suggested. 
While empirical results on the relationship between economic performance and political 
instability may be inconclusive when analysing ￿mild￿ cases of instability, there is no doubt that 
extreme political instability such as civil war has a significant negative impact on economic 
performance. Collier (1999) discusses why in his five-term summary of the main consequences 
of civil war on the economy: destruction, disruption, diversion, dissaving, and portfolio 
substitution. Each of these factors may individually affect economic performance suggesting that 
their combination compounds the effect. 
The fact that the destruction of physical and human capital has direct consequences on 
the economy does not need elaboration. Furthermore, the disruption of social order and the 
accompanying suppression of civil liberties hamper service delivery and hence sustained 
economic activity. Social disorder also affects the capacity of institutions to maintain an 
optimally organised society. Moreover, the diversion of resources from output-enhancing 
activities to war and security services reduces productive investment, hurting the economy. In 
addition, wars usually induce agents to dissave as a response to losses resulting from the three 
factors above.  
Generally, in response to an adverse economic environment created by political turmoil, 
economic agents engage in portfolio substitution. They switch to foreign currency denominated 
assets or simply transfer their assets abroad. When it is difficult to switch to foreign currency or 
foreign assets, agents may over-invest in non-productive sectors such as real estate. The direct 
                                                                                                                                                      
connection, Nkurunziza and Bates (2003) report that zeros represent 85 percent of all observations of the ￿war 




impact of these portfolio changes is a decline in a country￿s economy and its tax base. Faced 
with a dwindling tax base, a government may have no alternative but to increase inflationary tax 
to fund the war and to ensure continuity in delivery of basic services.
5 
The empirical literature on the use of inflation tax in politically unstable regimes points 
to a number of reasons why governments use this source of revenue. First, the adoption of 
policies that reduce inflation may not be incentive-compatible. During periods of political 
instability opportunistic governments may use inflation tax if reducing inflation is costly in the 
short term. As a government may not expect to remain in office to reap the benefits of low 
inflation, it has no incentive to adopt inflation-reducing policies [Edwards and Tabellini (1991)].  
Secondly, a collapsing government may choose high inflation to leave a legacy of high 
instability that would create difficulties and destabilise subsequent governments [Cukierman, et 
al. (1992)]. Thirdly, high inflation may reflect a failure by a weak government to implement 
inflation-reducing policy reforms when it cannot form consensus within its ranks in favour of 
the reforms. Fourthly, inflation tax may be an optimal response to transitory unexpected 
budgetary shocks. In this case, inflation tax is used for tax smoothing purpose [Calvo and 
Guidotti (1993)]. These different hypotheses suggest that the reasons explaining the use of 
inflation tax in periods of political instability are context specific.  
In Burundi, high inflation and frequent devaluations during the war period have reduced 
the real value of assets held in domestic currency. However, the cost of switching assets into 
foreign currency denominated assets is high due to government controls of capital account 
                                                 
5 Ending the war may be the first best choice for a government. However, once wars have started, the factors 
explaining their duration may be different from those explaining their onset. Therefore, even a willing government 




transactions, so it is not easy to move assets across currencies.
6 Moreover, the single alternative 
foreign currency-denominated asset available within the economy is foreign cash obtained in the 
parallel market. Given this context, anecdotal evidence suggests that agents have heavily invested 
in real estate to protect themselves from the impact of inflation and the depreciation of the 
Burundi franc. This change in portfolio behaviour may have limited the extent to which the 
government could tax money holdings. 
 
2.2. War Incidence and its Economic Impact in Burundi 
Burundi represents a case of extreme political instability that has led to state failure.
7 The 
country has experienced wars in 1965; 1972; 1988; 1991 and 1993 to date. In fact, given the way 
these conflicts have raised the same unresolved issues arising from previous wars, it is more 
appropriate to say that the country has experienced five episodes of one civil war. Only the war 
that started in 1993 has had dramatic consequences on the economy given its exceptional 
duration relative to all previous episodes. The current episode is in its tenth year, compared to a 
total duration of nine months for the previous four episodes.
8 
In the first four episodes, repressions shortened the duration of the conflicts to a few 
months, limiting economic but not human loss. From October 1993 to date, about 300,000 lives 
                                                 
6 The phenomenon of currency substitution was widely observed in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s, a 
period of high political and macroeconomic instability in the region [see, for instance, Dornbusch, et al. (1983)].  
7 A failed state is characterised by the inability of the central government to impose order and deliver positive 
political goods to its people [Rotberg (2002)]. 
8 For a detailed discussion of the reasons explaining this exceptionally long episode, see Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 




have been lost, 700,000 people have become refugees and up to 900,000 have been internally 
displaced. 
Table 1: Duration and Incidence of Civil War 
Years Duration 
(months) 





1965 2  5  0  N.A.  Muramvya 
1972  4  200 300  6 Whole  country 
1988 2  15  50  16  Ngozi,  Kirundo 
1991 1  1-3  38  3  Cibitoke,  Bubanza, 
Bujumbura 
1993￿  127  300 687  2 Whole  country 
Total  30% time  10% populat.  -  -   
Source: Nkurunziza (2001a). 
*: Number of Burundi refugees in DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania (UNHCR data). It is the difference between total 
refugees and refugees a year before the crisis.  
 
One consequence of the pattern presented in Table 1 is that until the latest episode, Burundians 
had particular expectations of short wars. Despite their brutality, the first four episodes were 
short and had a relatively limited direct impact on the economy. When the current war erupted 
in October 1993, economic agents￿ expectations were that it would be another short war. It is 
only when it was felt that the army had failed to crush the rebellion as it had done before that 
people￿s attitudes changed. These expectational errors help explain why most economic variables 
reacted to the war onset with a lag. 
The war has increased macroeconomic instability.
9 For instance, the probability of a 
monthly inflation rate exceeding 2.5 percent was 0.13 between 1980 and 1989 but almost 
doubled to 0.23 between 1990 and 1999. As AgØnor (2000) and Ali (2001) note, there is a 
negative relationship between macroeconomic instability and economic growth and the 
                                                 
9 Measures of macroeconomic instability include the exchange rate premium, the rate and volatility of inflation, real 




relationship tends to be stronger the higher the instability. GDP per capita in Burundi has now 
declined to less than $200, one-third lower than at independence 40 years ago. The economy 
recorded negative growth rates between 1993 (-6.0 percent) and 1996 (-8.4 percent), the latter 
being the lowest growth rate recorded in the last 25 years.  
Macroeconomic and political instability have increased uncertainty, reducing investment 
and production. The rate of investment plummeted to 5.8 from 13.8 percent of GDP between 
1993 and 1998 [Burundi (1999)]. The ratio of medium and long-term credit to GDP declined 
from 34 to 25 percent between 1992 and 1997, translating bankers￿ perception of high risk and 
uncertainty. During the same period, cash credit to firms increased by 71 percent as a result of 
rising input prices and difficult economic conditions facing the business community. War has 
also badly affected the government￿s ability to raise revenue, especially foreign aid. Being an aid 
dependent country, Burundi suffered from the decline in aid transfers that imposed a strong 
constraint on the government￿s ability to prosecute the war and carry out its traditional 
functions. 
 
2.3. War, Fiscal Crisis and Inflation Tax 
Although the fiscal revenue crisis in Burundi does not originate from the war of the 1990s 
[Ndikumana (2001)] it is clear that government revenue collapsed as a result of the war. As 
shown in Figure 1, Annex 1, the lowest value of tax revenue in 1997 corresponds to half of the 
value just before the war in 1991-92. Some factors specific to the war period help explain this 
decline. Firstly, the destructions resulting from the war reduced the tax base. Secondly, war 
disrupted economic and moral institutions, making tax compliance and tax collection difficult. 




import and export transactions, and hence taxes from international trade. Fourthly, the 
dwindling of international aid transfers starved Burundi of its main source of foreign currency. 
Table 2 gives the evolution of the budget from 1992, just before the war started, to 2001.  
 
 
Table 2: Principal Budget Components: GDP shares (1) and in Billions of Real Burundi Francs (2) 
  1992  1994  1996 1998 2000 2001 
Revenue & Grants  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Tax on: 
Income & Profits 
Goods & Services 
Intern. Trade 
Other Tax 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Grants 













































































































     









Transfers and subsidies 
 



































































































































































































































































CPI (1990=100)  114 141 221 319 369 404
GDP Growth  0.7 -3.7 -8.4 4.8 -0.9 2.1
Source: Data from IMF (1997, 1999, 2002). 
 
The revenue side of the budget suggests that in terms of their shares in GDP, most taxes did not 




relatively constant share of tax in GDP implies that the actual amounts of taxes declined. Figure 
1 in Annex 1 illustrates the discrepancy between scaled and un-scaled figures. Generally, un-
scaled values (real Burundi francs) in the shaded columns of Table 2 show more decline than the 
shares in GDP. Almost all sources of government revenue, including grants, declined 
immediately when the war started in 1993. Although some of these revenue sources are 
recovering they have not reached their pre-war levels.  
However, the most dramatic decline was with respect to grants. The main reason is the 
freezing of aid by the international community in reaction to a coup d￿Øtat that triggered the 
October 1993 war. Even using the ratio to GDP, the data show that from almost 9 percent of 
GDP in 1992, the share of grants had been divided by 5 in 2001. The lowest share in 1998 
represented just one-tenth of the value in 1992, aid￿s lowest level in the country￿s post-
independence history. The ratio of aid to GDP dwindled to a mere 4 percent in 1998 from 29 
percent in 1992, while per capita aid dropped from its record high of $54 in 1992 to its record 
low of $ 9, translating an 83 percent decline. The government￿s misery was compounded by the 
fact that the country￿s export revenues showed no sign of recovery from their declining trend 
over many years.  
With respect to the expenditure side of the budget, three points are worth noting. First, 
as expected, the military burden increased substantially as a result of the war. The share of the 
cost of military goods and services increased by more than 300 percent in less than ten years, 
while the salaries to the army increased by about 50 percent.
10 Military spending increased from 
                                                 
10  This last figure is rather surprising and is most probably underestimated. The size of the army increased 
manifolds during the war. According to Balancie and LaGrange (1996), Burundi had a 6,000-soldier strong army 
before the 1993 war. By the year 2000 ICG (2000) reports that the number had swelled to 45,500. Because military 
expenditures are treated as state secrets even in the most open political societies [see Brzoska (1995)], and given that 




an average of 7.2 percent of government spending in the 1980s to 25.8 percent in 1997. 
Secondly, the fact that domestic interest payments due increased by more than 300 percent 
between 1992 and 2001 suggests that the government was relying more and more on domestic 
debt to compensate for the loss of its revenue from traditional sources.  
Thirdly, one of the victims of the drop in government revenue was capital expenditure. 
Between 1992 and 2001, total capital expenditure was halved and capital expenditures financed 
by external resources were divided by four. This, in a way, was a consequence of the decline in 
grants and the fact that capital expenditures had been traditionally financed by foreign resources 
explains the collapse in investment. Unsurprisingly, the overall government deficit, including 
grants, increased from -2.9 to ￿10.1 percent of GDP between 1992 and 1996 before decreasing 
to -5.20 percent in 2001.  
In an attempt to reconcile the decline in revenue with the increase in military spending, 
the government operated some resource re-allocations. For instance, education expenditures 
declined from 4.2 percent of GDP in 1993 to 3.0 in 1998. Although the relative decline may 
seem modest, the absolute change and its impact on welfare are remarkable given that real GDP 
in 1998 was much lower than in 1993. Similarly, government expenditure on health decreased 
from 1.3 percent of GDP in 1993 to a mere 0.6 percent in 1998. However, budget reallocations 
could not, alone, compensate for the collapse in government tax revenue, foreign grants and 
export earnings. Inflation tax became an alternative source of revenue as Table 4 illustrates. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
the donor community discourages the use of donor money to purchase weapons, it is very likely that the figures for 




Table 3 gives shares of seigniorage and inflation tax in total government revenue based on three 
aggregates: reserve money, money in circulation and the reserves of the banking sector. 
 
Table 3: Shares of Seigniorage and Inflation Tax in Total Government Revenue (%) 
  Seigniorage to revenue  Inflation tax to revenue
  Average  Change  Average  Change
Full Sample: 1980-2002        
Reserve money  5.6 6.4 
Money in circulation  4.7 5.4 
Reserves of the banking sector  0.8 0.5 
  
Pre-war Sub-sample: 1980-1993   
Reserve Money  5.1 4.5 
Money in circulation  3.9 3.6 
Reserves of the banking sector  0.7 0.3 
  
War Sub-sample: 1994-2002   
Reserve Money  6.5 27 9.5  111
Money in Circulation  5.8 49 8.2  128
Reserves of the banking sector  1.0 43 0.8  167
 
In Table 3, seigniorage increases whether one measures it based on reserve money or money in 
circulation. However, the most dramatic change is observed with respect to inflation tax. From 
the pre-war to the war period, inflation tax more than doubled. Reserves of the banking sector 
recorded the highest increase, suggesting that the government may have increased the reserve 
ratio to collect more taxes. However, there may also have been a genuine need to increase the 




Although the absolute values of inflation tax may appear low relative to other countries, 
the changes were significant in a country that had traditionally enjoyed low levels of inflation tax 
and seigniorage. Between the 1970s and the early 1980s, inflation tax was 6.4 percent of revenue 
in Burundi while the rate was 10.3 in Rwanda, 25.5 in DRC and 55.6 in Uganda [Edwards and 
Tabellini (1991)]. The average inflation rate from 1970 to 1982 was 10.8 percent in Burundi 
relative to 12.7 in Kenya, 12.5 in Rwanda, 16.4 in Tanzania, 34.3 in Uganda and 42.8 in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Over the same period, the level of seigniorage as a 
percentage of government revenue was 6.4 percent in Burundi in comparison to 4.5 for Kenya, 
10.3 for Rwanda, 9.3 for Tanzania, 24.8 for Uganda and 15.5 for DRC [Cukierman, et al. (1992)]. 
The traditionally low level of inflation in Burundi suggests that economic agents inflation 
thresholds that trigger flight from currency may be relatively low than in other countries in the 
region.  
A more structural reason explaining the flight from currency phenomenon at relatively 
low levels of inflation is the high share of the subsistence sector in Burundi￿s economy. Over the 
period 1965 to 1998, the average ratio of M2 to GDP was only 15 percent, which is 7 percentage 
points lower than the African average. The level of M2/M1 stands at 1.35, about half the 
average for Africa. These statistics show that Burundi is less monetised even in comparison with 
other poor economies. As a result, in a context where people have limited usage of money, they 








2.4. War, Inflation and Exchange Rate Policy 
Table 4 shows that significant changes in key macroeconomic variables have taken place during 
the war period. 
 
Table 4: Change in Macroeconomic Variables before and after the Start of the War 
  Mean (%) Variation (%)   Peak Year
Full Sample: Period from 1980:1 to 2002:4    
Inflation 10.5   1997  (31%)
Official rate depreciation  12.0   1984 (29%)
Parallel rate depreciation  13.5   1999 (47%)
Exchange rate premium  36.0   1999 (67%)
Money in circulation as a share of GDP  6.5   1995   (8%)
   
First Sub-sample: Period from 1980:1 to 1993:3   
Inflation 7.0   1984  (14%)
Official rate depreciation  7.0   1984 (29%)
Parallel rate depreciation  11.0   1991 (44%)
Exchange rate premium  27.0   1992 (49%)
Money in circulation as a share of GDP  6.0   1981   (7%)
   
Second Sub-sample: Period from 1993:4 to 2002:4   
Inflation 14.0 100  1997  (31%)
Official rate depreciation  17.0 143  2000 (28%)
Parallel rate depreciation  16.0 45  1999 (47%)
Exchange rate premium  45.0 67  1999 (67%)
Money in circulation as a share of GDP  7.0 17  1995   (8%)
Source: Computed based on data from Burundi central bank and IMF (2004).  
 
What explains the changes in inflation and exchange rates? A significant proportion of the 




percent of the consumer price index (CPI) and 98 percent of the food items in the basket are 
domestically produced. As the country fell into chaos in October 1993, food markets collapsed 
and food prices rose sharply. As a result, inflation increased from an average 5 percent per 
annum over the period 1970-1989 to 16 percent in the period 1990-1999 (see Figure 1(a)). As 
Figure 2 in Annex 1 shows, it is noteworthy that the curve representing the food price index, 
indistinguishable from that representing general CPI before 1993 stochastically dominates the 
latter in the whole period post-October 1993. Hence, although the general CPI increased 
remarkably, food prices increased even faster.  
Food inflation resulted from the drop in the production of food due to the killing of 
farmers or their displacement into cantonment camps. In 1997, the index of food production 
had declined by 20 percent relative to its 1990 level. In addition to the decline in food 
production, food inflation was the consequence of restricted trade due to instability. Rebels￿ 
ambushes on strategic roads and combats between them and the army hamper the movement of 
people and goods. This is especially the case in Bujumbura, the capital city, which is surrounded 
by hills in which the rebels have established their safe havens.
11  
Another factor explaining the rise in inflation has been the increase in the prices of 
imported goods mainly due to devaluations. Faced with a foreign currency crisis, the 
government devalued regularly the official exchange rate as it could no more afford to defend it. 
The depletion of foreign reserves in 1998/1999 corresponded with the highest level of the 
premium and the highest devaluation rates of the official exchange rate over the sample period 
                                                 
11 The rebels shell regularly the capital and ambush commercial and private vehicles going to or from Bujumbura. 
The main roads leading to the capital city are also often closed to traffic for many consecutive days when there are 




[see Figures 1(d) and 1(c), respectively]. Subsequently, the government was forced to adopt a 
more open foreign exchange policy. 
A new law spelling out the modalities of foreign currency trading was enacted in 
November 1999. It was the first time since the mid-1960 that significant liberalisation measures 
were introduced in foreign currency trading even if important controls still remain. In the same 
context, under pressure from the donor community, the government accepted to allocate foreign 
currency through periodic auctions as a condition for the resumption of some level of aid. The 
first such auction was held on July 4
th, 2000. Figure 1(d) shows that although the new policy of 
allocating foreign currency did not succeed to unify the two foreign exchange markets, it 
reduced the premium immediately, a result that has been lauded by the IMF [see IMF (2003)]. 
From the year 2000, the premium has dropped back to its pre-1990s level, oscillating between 20 
and 40 percent.
12 
We should note that although the rate of inflation in Burundi could be considered low in 
comparison with other countries that have experienced similar or even less acute political crises, 
Burundi￿s inflation is high in relative terms. Before the 1990s, the country had kept inflation at a 
fairly low level. In the 1980s the rate of inflation was about 7 percent, a relatively low rate in 
comparison to other developing countries. In the 1990s inflation has been well above the 5 
percent target usually advocated by World Bank-IMF programmes and even the higher 8 percent 




                                                 
12 A detailed discussion of exchange rate policy and the determinants of the premium may be found in Nkurunziza 
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Figure 1 (i): Seigniorage (share of total revenue)
 
Inflation is computed as the relative change in the consumer price index using 1990 as the base 
year. An alternative measure of inflation that captures the capital loss due to inflation [see, for 





13 The depreciation of the official and parallel exchange rates is the relative change in 
the level of the variable. Inflation tax revenue is obtained by multiplying the rate of inflation and 
the real value of money in circulation. Seigniorage revenue is the sum of inflation tax and the 
change in real value of money in circulation. Total government revenue includes seigniorage or 
inflation tax revenue, depending on which of the two measures is used as a numerator. 
 
3. Methodology 
The methodology seeks to determine the extent to which the government may rely on inflation 
tax as a source of revenue. Given that the capacity of the government to collect inflation tax 
depends on the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation, the determination of 
the maximum inflation tax rate is based on the parameters of a money demand model.
14  
 
3.1. Determination of the Revenue-Maximising Rate of Inflation 
We outline a simple framework used for the determination of the revenue-maximising rate of 
inflation in the light of Rodriguez (1994) and AgØnor and Montiel (1996). Consider a standard 
money demand equation of the form: 
 
MV pQ =                                                                      (1) 
                                                 
13  The measure is given as  ( ) ( ) 11 11 [/ ] / [ 1 / ] tt t tt t pp p pp p − −− − −+ − .  It  h a s  b een  a r gue d  t h a t  t h is  is  t h e  
￿correct discrete-time measure of the alternative cost of holding money￿ [Easterly, et al. (1995: 590)]. 
14 Our objective is not to estimate a structural model of seigniorage. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) estimate such 




where  M is the stock of money, V is velocity,  p  is price level and Q is GDP. Issuing money 
allows the government to finance its current expenditure amounting to( ) // dM dt p. As a ratio 
of GDP, this revenue is equivalent to: 
 
( )( ) ( ) 1/ / / tax I V dV dt g V π =− + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦                                              (2) 
 
where  tax I  is inflation revenue, π is the rate of inflation and  g is the rate of GDP growth. 
Assuming constant velocity consistent with the actual level of inflation and assuming that actual 
and expected inflation are identical equation (2) gives the steady-state level of inflation tax as: 
 
( )/ tax Ig V π =+                                                                 (3) 
 
If velocity is of the standard form: 
 
0 lnVVb π = +                                                                  (4) 
 
where  b is the inflation semi-elasticity of demand for money, we derive the optimal level of 






















⇒= − + =
                                      (5)  




Solving for π in equation (5) yields the maximum level of inflation, which is equal to: 
 
* (1/ ) bg π = −                                                                       (6) 
 
3.2. Estimation of the Semi-elasticity of the Demand for Money 
The parameter b , the semi-elasticity of the demand for money with respect to inflation, can be 
easily estimated on the basis of equation (4).
15 However, as we are interested in contrasting the 
levels of pre-war and war inflation tax, we use quarterly data and estimate money demand 
models on both sub-samples and on the full sample. AgØnor and Montiel (1996) propose an 
equation of money demand expressed as a partial adjustment mechanism of actual to desired 
levels of the stock of money:  
 
01 2 (1 )
a
tt t j t k t maa ya me λλ λ π λ +− =+ − + − +                                     (7) 
 
where  t m is the log of the real stock of money,  t y is the log of real income as a scale variable; 
a
tk π + is the expected rate of inflation for period tk + , which proxies for the opportunity cost of 
                                                 
15 Using general-to-specific methodology, we have run velocity on GDP deflator using annual data covering 34 
years (from 1966 to 1999) to estimate equation (4). The regression results are: 
0.1725 0.0068 0.8856 ( 1)
  s.e.     [0.3602]   [0.0030]            [0.1638]
VELO DEFL VELO =+ + −
which gives a long run semi-elasticity of 5.94 and a maximum tax 
rate of 16.8 percent. These values are almost equal to the ones for M1 estimated using quarterly data (but not 
reported in this paper). We proceed and use quarterly data and estimate directly the semi-elasticity of inflation to 
money demand as the data allow us to have more degrees of freedom and estimate the model on the pre and post-




holding money; 01 λ <<  is the rate of adjustment and  t e is a disturbance term. The expected 
level of inflation is proxied by the actual inflation rate measured as the change in CPI. Given 
that t y is not available in quarterly frequency and since we are interested in splitting the sample in 
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Equation (8) is estimated using the general-to-specific methodology by which a general over-
parameterised model is reduced to its most parsimonious specification. Given potential 
simultaneity and other general econometric issues posed by the estimation of money demand 





                                                 




4. Data Characteristics and Structural Change 
The first sub-section discusses data sources, their units of measurement and the way the 
variables are constructed. The second sub-section focuses on the characteristics of the individual 
variables, their order of integration and the presence of structural breaks. Knowing the exact 
time a variable ￿breaks￿ and comparing the date to the time when the war erupted can give 
suggestions about economic agents￿ expectations as we discuss below. 
 
4.1. Data: Sources and Definitions 
The sample period covers 23 years, from January 1980 to December 2002. We, therefore, have 
55 quarters before October 1993 and 37 quarters after. The data on money aggregates, official 
exchange rate and prices is collected from IMF (2004) and Burundi central bank. The data on 
government revenue are from Burundi central bank. The data on the parallel exchange rate were 
collected from different issues of Currency Alerts and Burundi central bank. All the variables are 
computed from monthly observations.  
  In order to reduce the impact of outliers, money in circulation and government revenue 
were re-computed as three-month moving averages before their transformation into quarterly 
variables. For instance, M0 in January 1980 was computed as the simple average of the 
observations for January, February and March, and so on. There are three variables of focus in 
this section, namely M0, government revenue, excluding inflation tax, in real millions of Burundi 
francs, and inflation. The first two variables are deflated on the basis of the consumer price 
index, using 1990 as the base year.  




4.2. Testing for Unit Roots and Structural Change  
Unit root testing helps to identify a variable￿s ￿data generating process-DGP￿, which is important 
for model building and inference. If the variables are integrated, their relationships are better 
modelled through cointegration and error correction methodology. If they are stationary, the 
long-run value of the dependent variable is just its mean so cointegration is ruled out. In such 
case, the relationship is best modelled using a simple OLS linear model. 
The procedure for testing for the order of integration is as follows. First, we use an 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test with drift and trend. If the null hypothesis of the presence 
of a unit root is rejected, we conclude that the variable is stationary. However, if the null is not 
rejected, we do not conclude that we have an integrated variable as the non-rejection of the null 
may be due to the low power of the ADF test [Enders (1995)]. Consequently, if ADF fails to 
reject the null, we use Phillips-Perron (PP) test. This non-parametric test is known to have more 
power than the parametric ADF. These two tests are the most commonly used in the literature.
17  
The presence of a structural break in the series may reduce even further the power of 
ADF and PP tests. As a result, the tests may fail to reject the null of unit root when the series are 
actually stationary, leading to wrong inference. For instance, in an interesting study on Nigeria, 
Ashworth, et al. (1999) show how the presence of a structural break in the official exchange rate 
misled researchers to conclude that the variable had a unit root, implying that there was no 
relationship between the stationary parallel rate and the official rate. It is through a careful 
testing strategy accounting for the structural break that Ashworth, et al. (1999) established that 
                                                 
17 Recent textbooks on time series econometrics discuss in detail the specifications of these tests [see, for instance, 




the variable was stationary. Further tests for unit root are carried out should ADF and PP fail to 
reject the null. 
To determine the dates of the breaks in a series, Perron (1989) estimates an 
autoregressive model including a drift, a time trend, a pulse dummy capturing a ￿crash￿ effect in 
the dependent variable and a level dummy variable capturing a negative growth rate effect. Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) and Andrews (1993) have argued that the date of the break should be 
determined rather than fixed; they propose a methodology that endogenously determines the 
date of a break.  
As we know exactly the quarter in which the war erupted, we follow Perron (1989) by 
specifying a simple autoregressive process that has a drift, a linear time trend, and two dummy 
variables.
18 The first is a pulse dummy variable that takes value 1 in the fourth quarter of 1993, 
the time when the war erupted, and zero otherwise. This variable measures the ￿crash￿ effect in 
the variable. The second dummy is a level variable taking value zero before the fourth quarter of 
1993 and 1 afterwards. A search process around the value when the crash is expected (1993:4) 
determines the date when the level dummy is significant and this corresponds with the date of 





                                                 
18Unlike Perron (1989) who is interested in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, we are interested in the 
dummy variables. Mankiew, et al. (1987) use a maximum likelihood approach to determine the dates of structural 





Table 5: Unit Root Tests and Structural Change 


















































Break date  1994:4 1994:2  1993:4
Note: The values in brackets in the first panel are 5 percent critical t-statistics for unit root testing. Bracketed values 
in the second panel are the usual t-statistics. All unit root tests include a drift and a time trend. 
 
The tests show that all the three variables are stationary at 5 percent probability level or better. 
ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, despite their low power especially in the presence of structural 
breaks, highly reject the null of a unit root. This result implies that there is no need to proceed 
further and use additional tests. 
In Table 5, the significance of the pulse dummy on government revenue and inflation 
imply that these variables reacted immediately to war outbreak. The negative (positive) sign of 
government revenue (inflation) means that revenue (inflation) declined (increased) immediately 
when war broke out. With respect to the significance and negative sign of the level dummy for 
government revenue and inflation, the meaning is that war led also to a long-term negative 
growth pattern for revenue and a positive growth for inflation.
19   
                                                 
19 The long-term impact of war on currency in circulation is weaker; the dummy is significant only at 10 percent 




5. Empirical Findings 
To compute the maximum rate of inflation tax, we first estimate the parameter b in equation (6) 
from a money demand equation based on money in circulation. Three long-run semi-elasticities 
are computed. Firstly we restrict the sample to the period before the war, namely 1980:1 to 
1993:3. Secondly, we compute the semi-elasticity corresponding with the war period from 1993:4 
to 2002:4. Finally, we use the full sample from 1980:1 to 2002:4 and contrast the results of the 
three regressions. Once the semi-elasticity is estimated, its value is substituted into equation (6) 
to compute the level of inflation that maximises government revenue.
20 Following are the results 
of the most parsimonious models from an over parameterised equation including 12 lags. 
 
Table 6.1: Estimation of Money Demand before the War (1980:1-1993:3) 




















Note:  p-values are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. A number of 
observations equal to the highest lag in the equation are ￿lost￿ in the estimation. Dummy Q2 is second 
quarter dummy.  
                                                 
20 We do not use the value of economic growth in the formulae, assuming that 0 g ≈ . 
Variable Coefficient Standard  Error P-value 
Constant 0.463 0.542 0.398 
INF -0.780 0.224 0.001 
M0(-1) 0.763 0.074 0.000 
M0(-7) 0.124 0.056 0.033 
Dummy Q2  0.302 0.017 0.000 
  
R-squared 0.881  
Adjusted R-squared  0.870  
Number of Observations  48  
Jarque-Bera (normality)   0.497 0.780 
LM Breusch-Godfrey Test  9.699 0.206 
ARCH Test  4.508 0.720 
Long-run semi-elasticity   -6.908  




The diagnostic tests suggest that the model is well specified. The R-squared shows that the 
model explains 87 percent of the variation in M0. Jarque-Bera normality test, Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial correlation LM test and ARCH test all suggest that the error term is well behaved. Before 
discussing the implications of the results, we estimate the semi-elasticity for the war period and 
for the full sample to contrast the results.  
 
Table 6.2: Estimation of Money Demand during the War Period (1993:4-2002:4) 
























Note:  p-values are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. A number of 
observations equal to the highest lag in the equation are ￿lost￿ in the estimation. Dummy Q2 and Q3 are 
second and third quarter dummies.  
 
As in the previous case, all the diagnostic tests suggest that the model is well specified. As 
expected, the long-run semi-elasticity increases during the war period. However, estimates in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 may be criticised as being inefficient as they are derived on the basis of few 
Variable Coefficient Standard  Error P-value 
Constant -0.277 0.273 0.319 
INF -0.734 0.191 0.001 
INF(-3) -0.555 0.172 0.003 
M0(-1) 1.297 0.121 0.000 
M0(-2) -0.354 0.122 0.007 
M0(-8) 0.124 0.054 0.028 
Dummy Q2  0.164 0.021 0.000 
Dummy Q3  -0.114 0.034 0.002 
  
R-squared 0.951  
Adjusted R-squared  0.939  
Number of Observations  37  
Jarque-Bera (normality)   0.617 0.734 
LM Breusch-Godfrey Test  10.990 0.202 
ARCH Test  5.656 0.686 
Long-run semi-elasticity   -19.346  




degrees of freedom. To address this worry, we re-estimate the model using the full sample where 
we add a dummy variable (DUMWAR) taking value 1 during the war period and zero otherwise. 
We add to the specification an interaction term of the war dummy with inflation to capture the 
joint effect of war and inflation. Table 6.3 reports the results.  
 
Table 6.3: Estimation of Money Demand for the Full Sample (1980:1-2002:4) 
Dependent variable is log real M0 estimated on lagged real M0, inflation and quarterly dummies. 
 
Note:  p-values are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. A number of 
observations equal to the highest lag present in the equation are ￿lost￿ in the estimation. Dummy Q2 is 
second quarter dummy.  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard  Error  P-value
Constant 0.425 0.227  0.066
INF -0.616 0.161  0.000
M0(-1) 0.821 0.061  0.000
M0(-4) 0.188 0.094  0.049
M0(-5) -0.221 0.083  0.009
M0(-7) 0.114 0.039  0.005
Dummy Q2  0.198 0.030  0.000
INF(-3)*DUMWAR(-3) -0.656 0.209  0.002
  
R-squared 0.907  
Adjusted R-squared  0.898  
Number of Observations  85  
Jarque-Bera (normality)   6.436   0.040
LM Breusch-Godfrey Test  12.21   0.094
ARCH Test  2.310   0.941
Long-run semi-elasticity full sample  -12.946  
Max-inflation tax rate full sample  7.7%  
Long-run semi-elasticity Pre-war sample  -6.270  




Diagnostic tests in Table 6.3 show that the model fails the Jarque-Bera normality test
21 but the 
other tests show no significant serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. This model is more 
efficient as it uses 85 quarters, double the sample size of each of the two previous models. It is 
relevant to note that computing the long-run semi-elasticity and the maximum inflation tax rate 
excluding the interaction term returns almost the same values as in the Pre-war period. These are 
-6.270 against -6.908 for the semi-elasticity and 15.9% and 14.5% for the maximum inflation tax 
rate, respectively. The value of the semi-elasticity for the full sample is 
( ) 6.908 19.346 / 2 13.127 12.946 − − =− ≈− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , which is almost equal to the average of the Pre-war 
and War Period semi-elasticities.
22 
These results show a clear effect of war on the long-run semi-elasticity of money 
demand. The doubling of inflation from a relatively low level of 7 percent before the war to 14 
percent during the war changed economic agents￿ attitudes. Whether we consider the maximum 
rate of inflation for the full sample or for the war period, it is clear that inflation moved to the 
￿bad￿ side of the Laffer curve provoking a negative reaction towards holding domestic currency. 
The increase in the semi-elasticity from 6.9 before the war to 19.3 during the war illustrates this 
attitude. This phenomenon described in the literature as ￿flight from currency￿ eroded the 
                                                 
21 However, even when the error term fails the Jarque-Bera normality test, the coefficients of the model may be 
unbiased and consistent if the variance is finite. In the specific case under analysis, we know that the variance is 
finite since both money demand and inflation are stationary. 
22 Computing the semi-elasticity based on M1 for comparison with other studies on African economies using the 
same variable, we found that the semi-elasticity is 5.23, a value that is comparable with Zambia￿s 5.30 [see Adam 
(1999)]. Randa (1999) finds a value of 5.43 for Tanzania, which is close to values for Burundi and Zambia. We 
deduce that our data and our methodology produce findings that are comparable with work done on similar 




government￿s capacity to maintain a high level of inflation tax revenue for a long time as 
illustrated in Figure 1(h).  
Inflation tax increased for about four years after the war onset between 1994 and 1998 
before declining back to its pre-war level. The increase was nevertheless significant given that 
the country had traditionally relied less on inflation tax revenue in comparison with other 
countries in the region.  
The response of economic agents to increases in inflation may translate more than the 
attitude towards price changes. In Burundi, holding money has become dangerous. Those 
suspected of keeping money in their houses have been the victims of marauding rebels who loot 
them to finance their war. As rural households have no access to banking facilities where they 
could safely keep their cash, they may prefer to stay away from money.  
People in cities, on the other hand, have switched to physical assets which are not easily 
preyed upon by government taxation or easily looted by rebels. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no documented evidence of the type of assets economic agents invested in during the 
war. There is some anecdotal evidence that wealthy individuals in urban centres invested heavily 
in real estate. Many visitors to Bujumbura have been amazed by the boom in the construction 
sector during a period of war. Over the last ten years, more than three new estates have been 
developed in and around Bujumbura. New houses are mushrooming everywhere, pushing 
building material prices very high.  
Additionally but to a limited extent, people with some spare cash may have exchanged 
Burundi francs for dollars using the parallel market.
23 Burundi may be experiencing portfolio 
                                                 
23 The parallel market in Burundi is mostly used for current account transactions [Nkurunziza (2001b)]. This may 
explain why parallel market exchange rate variables were systematically insignificant in all the specifications of the 




behaviour similar to Uganda￿s during the country￿s war in the 1980s and early 1990s when agents 
abandoned money for coffee as a store of value [Henstridge (1999)]. 
  It is also possible that the situation in Burundi may have induced economic agents to 
transfer their wealth abroad, increasing capital flight. Information in Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 
(2002) shows that before the 1993 war, capital flight from Burundi represented 30 percent of 
revenue, on average. This rate was higher than in relatively stable countries such as C￿te d￿Ivoire 
(5 percent), Zimbabwe (13 percent), Mauritius (19 percent), Rwanda (20 percent), and Ghana 
(29 percent). However, the rate in Burundi was lower than in countries with traditionally high 
political instability such as Chad (91 percent), Uganda (57 percent), Nigeria (56 percent) and 
Mozambique (52 percent). 
  During the war period, between 1993 and 1997, the average ratio of capital flight almost 
doubled to 0.55, giving some credence to the hypothesis that capital flight may have been one 









                                                                                                                                                      
models of money demand presented in Tables 6.1 to 6.3. The result may be also due to multicollinearity with 
inflation. 




6. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
The paper has shown that the 1993 war has eroded the government￿s revenue from traditional 
sources, namely revenue from domestic taxes, foreign aid and export revenue. For example, the 
revenue from domestic taxes three years after the start of the war was about half of its value just 
before the war in 1992. Confronted with this unprecedented revenue erosion, the government 
attempted to raise revenue from inflation tax. From an average share in total revenue of less 
than 4 percent before the war, inflation tax shot to 18 percent in 1996 but declined back to its 
pre-war level in 1999.  
The increase in inflation tax was just temporary. As the war persisted and the level of 
inflation remained in the ￿wrong￿ side of the Laffer Curve, economic agents responded by 
holding less and less domestic currency. The increase in the long-run semi-elasticity of demand 
for money from 6.9 to 19.3 translated a phenomenon known as ￿flight from domestic currency￿. 
This portfolio strategy dented the government￿s capacity to generate revenue out of inflation. As 
a result, inflation tax could not be used as a dependable source of government revenue.  
Although it is clear that economic agents became less interested in holding domestic 
currency in favour of other assets, there is no documented evidence on this portfolio 
substitution process. Anecdotal evidence suggests that wealthy individuals may have invested 
heavily in real estate while others may have preferred to hold foreign currency acquired in the 
parallel market. It is also possible that political and economic instability in Burundi increased 
capital flight, as descriptive statistics have suggested. More detailed research on portfolio 
behaviour during the war period would be a relevant extension to this study. 
One policy conclusion arising from the analysis is that it is most probably cost effective 




certain to win. The loss in taxes, export earnings, aid transfers and diplomatic support had a 
heavy toll on government actors that had been, for a long time, used to repressions as a way of 
quelling previous rebellions. The government can no longer rely on repressions to resolve 
longstanding political issues. This latest war went out of government￿s control, and, for the first 
time in the country￿s history, the government, under duress, ended up engaging in political 
negotiations with the rebels. 
Moreover, domestic economic agents￿ portfolio substitution and the freezing of 
international aid starved the government of the resources necessary to finance the war. The 
result was an increase in the likelihood that those in power would lose the war and consequently 
their power. Whereas war should be an act of last resort, a government uncertain of winning a 
war would probably be better off avoiding it. Burundi leaders should learn the lesson that the 
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